This paper investigates the impact of institutions on the dollarization of the domestic banking system by using a unique policy experiment: the accession process of countries to the European Union (EU). Using a dynamic factor model, we decompose ‡uctuations in …nancial dollarization for 24 transition economies into a world factor, an EU factor, and country-speci…c factors. The EU factor, which proxies for improvements in institutions under the set criteria for eventual membership, reveals the importance of institutions for the extent of …nancial dollarization over time. The results also indicate the asymmetric impact of improved institutions on the domestic bank's balance sheets by inducing higher loan dollarization and lower deposit dollarization. The relative importance of the EU factor to the …nancial dollarization of a country is associated with the degree of comovement of its business cycle with that of the EU.
Introduction
In recent years, considerable attention has been given to the examination of the causal factors of …nancial dollarization (FD). This increased e¤ort is an outcome of the perceived role of FD as a trigger mechanism for balance of payments and …nancial crises, and overall macroeconomic instability, in the light of exchange rate swings. The reasoning is that large depreciations reduce the net worth of banks and …rms with (unhedged) foreign-currencydenominated liabilities, so that FD can lead to sharp contractions in output. The literature has converged to the importance of a set of variables as determinants of FD, with institutional quality featuring as prominent amongst them. This paper contributes to the literature by further corroborating the signi…cance of institutions for the level of FD by exploiting a unique historical policy experiment: participation to the European Union (EU). The theories that explain the level and persistence of FD can be summarized by the currency substitution view, the asset portfolio view, the market failure view, and the institutional view. 1 As it concerns the latter, the quality of institutions can in ‡uence FD through a variety of channels. First, short-sighted monetary policymakers may create an in ‡ation surprise in order to stimulate output growth. If this policy persists, higher in ‡a-tion, by eroding the value of the domestic currency, induces agents to switch into foreign currency holdings. Second, …scal policymakers looking for easy ways to generate revenue may put pressure on monetary authorities to "run the presses,"the result being higher levels of seigniorage, in ‡ation and dollarization. Third, to the extent that weak institutions detract from the credibility of a commitment not to bail out foreign-currency debtors in the event of a sudden devaluation, they may compound the mispricing associated with implicit gov- corruption, and rule of law. 2 In all cases, higher levels of institutional quality have been found to be associated with lower degrees of deposit dollarization. continue to experience high levels of deposit dollarization, this being an outcome of their poor institutions. In addition, they illustrate that higher deposit dollarization is a rational response of agents in economies ridden with high public debt, as that leads to a high risk of debt default and fuels investor's expectations for domestic currency depreciations and higher future rates of in ‡ation. Thus, current low in ‡ation and high dollarization can co-exist due to agents'expectations of higher future in ‡ation rates. 4 Obviously, the last two papers share a common feature in that they speci…cally consider the role of institutions for the extent of dollarization. But, at the same time, they proxy the de…nition of institutions in a di¤erent way. Honig (2009) does so in a more direct manner, while Vieira et al. (2012) , on top of the direct way, uses the size of the domestic debt, which may be an outcome of reckless …scal policy, itself a proxy of poor governance.
Our paper also considers the role of institutions on a country's exposure to foreign exchange risk by determining the e¤ect on the uno¢ cial dollarization of the domestic banking system. Our innovation, however, is to use an explicit historical policy decision to proxy for improvements in institutional quality, this being a country's decision to join the EU. The process toward EU membership is composed of three distinct stages, where candidate countries need to progress towards meeting the 'Copenhagen criteria'. These criteria state that a country must achieve (i) stability of institutions guaranteeing democracy, the rule of law, human rights and respect for and protection of minorities; (ii) the existence of a functioning market economy as well as the capacity to cope with competitive pressure and market forces within the Union; and (iii) the ability to take on the obligations of membership including adherence to the aims of political, economic and monetary union. In addition, the path to EU accession requires all prospective members to align their legislation with the body of European law and to pursue price stability as their primary objective of monetary policy (Eco…n, 2000) .
The above conditions represent a clear commitment from the candidate countries'governments and monetary authorities in following policies that re ‡ect improved quality of governance and in promoting long-run currency stability. In other words, the objective is to foster institutional development as a way of deepening European integration. For this reason, we argue that the procedure toward EU admission can be used to proxy for institutional improvement, as it signi…es an institutional regime shift, and assess potential changes in …nancial dollarization. In this way, our analysis complements the works of Honig (2009) and Vieira et al. (2012) in capturing the e¤ect of institutions.
A number of inter-disciplinary studies have examined the link between EU accession, on the one hand, and institutional and macroeconomic outcomes, on the other. Kelley (2004) and Belke et al. (2009) show that pre-membership conditions set by the EU clearly enhance institutional development, while the economic bene…ts of institutional reform due to EU membership have been estimated to be higher GDP growth of 24%-36% in 25 Central and Eastern European countries (Piazolo, 1999) and increased consumption per capita in Turkey by 9% (Lejour and Mooij, 2005 ). Neanidis and Savva (2011) have also estimated the e¤ect of in ‡ation uncertainty on the rate of in ‡ation prior to EU accession and during EU accession and entry. Due to the in ‡ationary bias of the authorities prior to accession, nominal uncertainty was found to raise in ‡ation. This positive e¤ect disappeared during EU accession because it o¤ered a strict commitment mechanism to the acceeded countries' monetary authorities to price stability. For our study, we limit our interest to 24 transition economies in Central and Eastern Europe and the Former Soviet Union for one main reason. It is from this set of countries that some have gone through the EU membership process with a subset having become full members in recent years. Thus, this group of countries represents a natural environment to study our main hypothesis on whether, and how, changes in institutional quality a¤ect FD, de…ned as deposit and loan dollarization. We identify the impact of higher integration with the EU on the level of FD with the use of a dynamic latent factor model that decomposes ‡uctuations in FD into the following factors: (i) a world factor, which picks up ‡uctuations that are common across all transition economies; (ii) an EU factor that captures movements that are common to countries participating in the EU accession process; and (iii) country factors that are speci…c to each country. Importantly, the model allows us to trace the evolution of each of the factors over time and, thus, examine their separate roles in shaping a country's level of FD.
The empirical evidence indicates that institutional quality, proxied by EU convergence, is an important determinant of FD. Moreover, it is shown that there has been a rise over time of the relative importance of the EU factor in accounting for ‡uctuations in both deposit and loan dollarization. The results also point to an asymmetric e¤ect of the EU factor on the two types of banking dollarization, causing lower deposit but higher loan dollarization. Finally, variance decomposition analysis suggests that the relative contribution of the EU factor to the FD in each country can be linked with the country's business cycle synchronization with the EU cycle.
The remainder of the paper is organized as follows. Section 2 describes the empirical methodology and the data. Section 3 presents the …ndings of the analysis. Section 4 provides the concluding comments.
Methodology and Data
The focus of this paper is to answer the following questions: First, what are the major factors driving …nancial dollarization in transition economies? Are these factors mainly common to all these countries (global), or is there a distinct factor speci…c to those countries that participate in EU accession arrangements that help shape up their institutional environment? Second, how have these factors evolved as the process of EU membership, and subsequent institutional development, was progressing through its various stages? We use a dynamic factor model, based on Stock and Watson (1991) and Kim and Nelson (1998) , to answer these questions. We …rst describe the data set and then discuss the main features and advantages of our methodological approach.
Data
Our data set is composed of 24 transition economies located in Central and Eastern Europe and the Former Soviet Union. 5 The sample includes 12 countries a¢ liated to the EU either as Member States (Bulgaria, the Czech Republic, Estonia, Hungary, Latvia, Lithuania, Poland, Romania, the Slovak Republic, and Slovenia) or candidate countries (Croatia and Turkey), and 12 countries that are not a¢ liated to the EU in a formal way (Albania, Armenia, Belarus, Bosnia and Herzegovina, Georgia, Kazakhstan, Kyrgyz Republic, Macedonia FYR, Moldova, Russia, Serbia, and Ukraine). Formal admission to the EU proceeds in three stages:
the …rst stage represents the start of the negotiation process; the second stage corresponds to the completion of the negotiation process where the EU assigns a date of entry to the negotiating country; and the …nal stage re ‡ects the date after which full membership is granted. The dates of these stages for the 12 EU-a¢ liated countries are given in Table 1 . Table 2a are as follows. First, the degree of dollarization exhibits substantial variation both across and within countries. There are countries, like Armenia, Bulgaria, Georgia, and the Kyrgyz Republic, that have relatively high levels of both types of dollarization, while countries like the Czech Republic and Slovak Republic have low levels. There 6 Macedonia FYR has not been granted the status of candidate nation because EU accession negotiations have not yet started. 7 Exceptions are Turkey for which data on deposit dollarization are available since 1986, and the Slovak Republic and Slovenia for which the end-of-period coverage is at the end of 2008 and 2006, respectively, as a way of avoiding the periods after which these countries formally adopted the Euro as their legal tender.
are also countries where dollarization exhibits high variation over time (Armenia, Estonia, Georgia, Turkey), while in others the variations is very small (Bosnia and Herzegovina, Macedonia FYR, Moldova, Poland). Second, for some countries there is a clear mismatch between the levels of foreign currency loans and deposits-see, for instance, Albania, Croatia, Estonia, Serbia. Third, the average levels of both deposit and loan dollarization are lower in the EU-a¢ liated countries by about 16% and 7% respectively.
One more interesting piece of information appears in Table 2b , where we can observe the average degrees of dollarization for the EU-a¢ liated nations by dividing the sample into two distinct periods: the pre-EU and post-EU accession periods. The table illustrates that for the majority of the countries, a¢ liation with the EU has led to lower levels of deposit dollarization (for eight countries) and higher levels of loan dollarization (for nine countries); on average, deposit dollarization declined by 2.5% and loan dollarization rose by 7.5%.
The reason for this demarcation, we claim, is that EU accession enhances the credibility of economic reforms in candidate countries through the establishment of institutions common to EU members. A formal evaluation of this hypothesis follows in the next section.
Model Speci…cation
Dynamic factor models have become a popular econometric tool for quantifying the degree of comovement among …nancial and macroeconomic time series. The motivation underlying these models is to identify a few common factors that drive ‡uctuations in large data sets.
These factors can capture common ‡uctuations across the entire data set (i.e., the world) or across subsets of the data (e.g., a particular group of countries). The factor structure is directly motivated by general equilibrium models (see Altug, 1989, and Sargent, 1989) . The factors are interpreted as representing the e¤ects of many types of common shocks, such as technology shocks, monetary policy shocks or other, rather than speci…c types of shocks.
Our objective is to measure the impact of institutions on …nancial dollarization, where we proxy changes in institutions with the three-stage evolutionary process of EU membership.
For this purpose, we construct a model where we decompose …nancial dollarization into three factors: (i) a world factor, (ii) an EU factor, and (iii) an individual country factor. The world factor is common across all the countries in the system, whether the country is part of the EU accession process or not. For example, countries not a¢ liated with the EU, such as Ukraine, will have a world factor, and so will countries that are a¢ liated with the EU, like the Czech Republic. The EU factor is common across countries that are either candidates for admission into the EU, or are already full members. The portion of …nancial dollarization that cannot be explained by the latent unobservable (world and EU) factors is the idiosyncratic factor which is unique to each country. All dynamic relationships in the model are captured by modeling each of the factors and the idiosyncratic component as autoregressive processes.
Unlike most studies in the literature that focus just on deposit dollarization, we analyze the impact of institutions on both deposit and loan dollarization. This is a more inclusive approach since recent studies have shown that the determinants of deposit and loan dollarization may di¤er (see, for instance, Neanidis and Savva, 2009 ). Most of the models that use dynamic factor analysis are based on stationary variables (Stock and Watson, 2011) , as the use of non-stationary variables may create inference problems. To test whether deposit and loan dollarization are stationary, we perform a Phillips-Perron unit root test on these series for all countries in the sample. Table 3 reports the p-values of the test, which suggest that we cannot reject the null of unit root at all levels of signi…cance for every country except for Ukraine's deposit dollarization. Even in that case, though, there is weak evidence in support of non-stationarity. Therefore we conclude that the levels of both deposit and loan dollarization are non-stationary. 8 For this reason, we will be using the …rst di¤erences of the …nancial dollarization series, which are found to be stationary. Note, however, that even though our dynamic factor model is estimated in …rst di¤erences, we can extract the level of the unobserved (world, EU, and country-speci…c) factors that are of interest to us. Below we explain this methodology.
Suppose FD it stands for the change in …nancial dollarization (i.e., change in foreign currency deposits or loans) for country i at time period t. We can decompose this variable into three components
where C t is the world factor and estimates the impact of macroeconomic developments in the world economy on …nancial dollarization in country i at time t. For example, if there is a world wide panic which would increase dollarization across all countries, it would be captured by an increase in C t : In the same spirit, EU t denotes the EU factor that captures movements in FD that are common only to countries a¢ liated with the EU. The coe¢ cient i , known as factor loading, is a dummy variable set to one if country i has either begun the accession process, or is already a member of the union. Naturally, i = 0 for non-EU-a¢ liated countries in the sample. Finally, it is an idiosyncratic component, which is unique to each country. This idiosyncratic component re ‡ects ‡uctuations in FD that can be explained by individual country characteristics.
Since the two factors and the idiosyncratic component are unobserved, we need to specify a dynamic structure for their identi…cation. To this end, we follow the dynamic factor model of Stock and Watson (1991) and assume an AR(1) process for all three components. 9 They are speci…ed as
EU t = EU t 1 + t ; t~i id N (0; 2 ); and (3)
where the innovation terms in equations (2)-(4), t ; t ; and it , are mutually orthogonal across all equations and countries in the system. 9 The autoregressive processes can, in principle, be of di¤erent order. For simplicity and parsimony, however, we restrict them to be of order one. Since we are using monthly di¤erenced data, this should capture most spillovers across countries. In fact, if we …t an ARIMA model on the …rst-di¤erenced …nancial dollarization series, the AR(1) model seems to su¢ ce for all of the countries in our sample.
To disentangle the importance of the various factors, we can cast the dynamic factor model given by equations (1)-(4) into a state-space framework. For the sake of simplicity, suppose i = 3, and the three countries are the Czech Republic, Slovenia, and Ukraine. Here i = 0 for Ukraine 8t; while i = 1 for the Czech Republic and Slovenia from March 1998 onwards (see Table 1 ). In this framework, the measurement equation (1) 
while the state-space representation of the transition equations (2)- (4) 
Since for identi…cation the shocks in equations (2)- (4) 
To achieve identi…cation in this dynamic factor model, we assume zero covariance across shocks to the world, the EU and the idiosyncratic factors (see, for details, Morley et al., 2003) .
In our analysis, we generalize this three-country model into our sample of 24 countries, where as indicated earlier 12 countries fall into the EU membership criteria and the remaining 12 countries are not a¢ liated with the EU. The above state-space model is estimated using maximum likelihood via the Kalman …lter.
The model is estimated in …rst di¤erences with demeaned variables. To extract the level of the world and the EU factors, we follow Harvey (1989) as described in Kim and Nelson (2000) . If L t is the level of the factor we are interested in extracting, we can write the …ltered estimate L tjt = L tjt 1 + l tjt + . Here l tjt is the …rst di¤erence of the factor L t , while is the mean of l tjt . can be estimated using the formula = W (1) F D t , where F D t is the vector that contains the FD variables for each country and W (1) = (I (I KH)F ) 1 K:
Here K is the steady state Kalman gain derived from the Kalman …lter recursion and H is the loading on the state vector in the measurement equation. 10 
Variance Decomposition
We use variance decompositions to measure the relative contributions of the world, EU, and country-speci…c factors to changes in FD in each country. This provides an empirical assessment of how much of a country's ‡uctuations in FD are associated with world ‡uctuations or EU-related ‡uctuations. We estimate the share of the variance of deposit and loan dollarization attributable to each of the two factors and the idiosyncratic component. Because the world, EU and country-speci…c latent factors are by construction orthogonal to each other, it is possible to perform variance decomposition for these three components in the dynamics of F D based on equation (1), which can be rewritten as
or
The last term in equation (9) represents the variance of F D associated with countryspeci…c developments. As a result, the fraction of volatility due to, say, the EU factor would
which suggests that the share of each factor depends on its relative variance as well as the relative persistence of its autoregressive parameter.
Advantages of Dynamic Factor Models
As described in the Introduction, there is a rich literature that examines the determinants of uno¢ cial dollarization. In their majority, these studies rely on panel data econometric techniques to isolate the e¤ect of the variable(s) of interest. This requires that the model speci…cation controls for all variables that are potentially correlated with dollarization. Given, however, the complexity of this task and the lack of data for plausible determinants, it is not unlikely that analyses based on such techniques may be subject to a mis-speci…cation bias. A main advantage of our dynamic factor approach is that we do not have to control for every determinant separately as these are controlled for with the unobservable latent factors. Thus, as long as our parametric structure is correct, our approach yields signi…cant e¢ ciency gains. In dealing with mis-speci…cation in our model, we estimate variations of the benchmark model and show that changes have no impact on the baseline …ndings.
The estimated factors in our model-world, EU, country-re ‡ect elements of commonality of ‡uctuations in di¤erent dimensions of the FD data. The importance of studying all these factors in one model is that they identify the common components and, at the same time, detect how each country responds to these components. Moreover, since the factors are extracted simultaneously, we can assign a degree of relative importance to each factor through the decomposition analysis. As an outcome, one can identify and assess the role of institutions, proxied by the EU factor, on ‡uctuations in FD.
The factor model is well suited to studying the joint properties of ‡uctuations in both deposit and loan dollarization. Using both types of …nancial dollarization allows us to derive in a robust way its overall association with the institutional environment. Furthermore, this technique allows estimating the evolution of the e¤ect of interest over time. In this way, we can identify changes or breaks in the relationship between institutions and FD during the examined period of time. Importantly, such regime shifts can be traced back to changes in policies and, thus, o¤er intuitive interpretations and policy recommendations.
Finally, at a more technical level, the class of dynamic factor models we use (see Stock and Watson, 1991) allow eliminating idiosyncratic shocks and estimating common factors in many variables without running into scarce degrees of freedom problems. Such models also mitigate the need for strong assumptions necessary for structural models.
Empirical Results
In this section, we examine the evolution of the various factors and analyze their ability to track changes in …nancial dollarization in our sample. We then examine the sources of ‡uctuations across factors using variance decompositions. 11 We have veri…ed the robustness of the results by doing some sensitivity experiments. These included running the model with (i) the 12 EU-a¢ liated countries only, and (ii) a variable that captures the mismatch between loans and deposits in foreign currency, rather than with each type of dollarization separately. The results of these experiments are available upon request. economies has been …rst articulated by Neanidis and Savva (2009) . Their argument goes as follows.
Evolution of the World and EU Factors
Depositors and …nancial institutions in transition economies hold deposits and issue loans, respectively, in foreign currencies as a way of minimizing their portfolio risk in order to shield themselves against exchange rate ‡uctuations and seek for the highest expected rates of asset return. Naturally, the behavior of the two types of agents is driven by the di¤erent set of options available to them. Greater …nancial integration allows banks to have greater accessibility to foreign …nancial markets and instruments of diversifying currency risk in their asset portfolios compared to depositors. This means that …nancial integration provides banks with the opportunity to substitute foreign assets for foreign currency loans as a way of optimally reallocating their asset portfolio; this leads to lower loan dollarization, markedly so after 1998 when …nancial integration jumped to new heights. Depositors, on the other hand, have only limited direct access to international …nancial markets so that their opportunity for portfolio diversi…cation is restricted. As a result, …nancial integration has no discernible e¤ect on deposit dollarization. Thus, the common world factor that drives developments in …nancial dollarization is associated to …nancial integration. 12 The EU factor is orthogonal to the world factor by construction and, as we discussed earlier, any common shocks a¤ecting all countries will be picked up by the world factor. The EU factor captures any remaining comovement among countries within the group of EUa¢ liated nations. The time pro…le of the EU factor, for both deposit and loan dollarization, is presented in Figure 3 . As the …rst stage of the EU admission process for the early candidate countries started in March 1998 (see Table 1 ), this year signi…es the starting point of the EU factor. A visual inspection of the EU factor shows its antithetical e¤ect on the two types of dollarization: deposit dollarization has declined while loan dollarization rose. Furthermore, the gap between loan and deposit dollarization has widened after the end of 2002, indicated in Figure 3 by a solid vertical line.
How can we explain these results? The underlying mechanism corresponds to the improvements of a country's institutional environment during periods of EU accession negotiations. Joining the EU leads to convergence with EU institutions and lends credibility to the policy-makers of the candidate country. This reputational e¤ect is an outcome of the country's commitment to responsible monetary policies that promote con…dence in monetary stability (Honig, 2009 ) and sound …scal policies that ensure the sustainability of the public debt-to-GDP ratio (Vieira et al., 2012) . These policies, by contributing to long-run macroeconomic and currency stability, promote faith in the local currency.
According to Honig (2009) , higher con…dence in the domestic currency would decrease the extent of deposit dollarization because domestic depositors feel less inclined to hold foreign currency as a way of protecting their net wealth. At the same time, currency stability leads private sector borrowers to be more willing to borrow in foreign currency as they expect exchange rate oscillations to be avoided, thus, leading to higher loan dollarization. In the framework of an EU accession process, the decline in loan dollarization is expected to be exacerbated for three additional reasons. First, EU membership leads to higher trade and an increased volume of …nancial transactions. These activities provide hedging opportunities for …rms, as it makes it easier for them to hedge their foreign currency exposure. Second, EU a¢ liation encourages full access to foreign currency holdings, as prospective EU members will have to lift their restrictions on capital mobility. Third, due to diminishing currency risk, because of a growing Euro-orientation of exchange rate regimes, that derive their credibility from the clause that EU membership will lead to admission to the Economic and Monetary Union (EMU).
These interpretations are fully re ‡ected in the asymmetric e¤ect of the EU factor on deposit and loan dollarization. Moreover, the widening of the gap after 2002 coincides with the second stage of the EU accession process for eight of the countries (Table 1) . This period overlap is fully consistent with the view that depositors and creditors acknowledge the commitment and the achievements of their country's policy-makers in following policies that ensure …nancial stability, so that the EU factor expands as the country passes from one negotiation stage to the next. Thus, the EU factor becomes progressively more important in accounting for ‡uctuations in deposit and loan dollarization as the country's policies receive external validation by the EU in terms of improved economic management and institutional development.
Sources of Financial Dollarization Fluctuations
We now examine the sources of ‡uctuations in …nancial dollarization using a variance decomposition. As a measure of the importance of the factors for FD, we present the variance shares attributable to each factor for the world, the EU and the individual country. Table 4 shows the results for this variance decomposition for deposit and loan dollarization. The results suggest that the world factor accounts for a very small percentage of changes in both the loan and deposit dollarization in almost all countries. This is particularly the case for the EU-a¢ liated countries where the total variation explained by the world factor ranges from 0.3% to 7.84%. The fraction of variation in …nancial dollarization ‡uc-tuations explained by the world factor in non-EU-a¢ liated countries is, on average, larger than its EU counterparts, but not substantially so. Some notable exceptions are Bosnia and Herzegovina and Macedonia FYR where the world factor accounts, respectively, for 15% and 13% of the overall variation in deposit dollarization, and 23% and 32% of the volatility in loan dollarization.
Once we account for the world factor, are there any common movements in FD across the group of EU-oriented countries? The results show that, on average, the EU factor plays a greater role in explaining changes in deposit dollarization (31%) than changes in loan dollarization (20%). As compared to the world factor, the EU factor accounts for remarkably larger shares of FD variances in each country, further supporting the role of institutional improvements on the countries' dollarization of the banking system. Table 4 also indicates that the relative importance of the EU factor is neither uniform across the EUa¢ liated countries, nor equal between the two forms of dollarization. There is a signi…cant variation in the role of the EU factor in explaining changes in deposit (loan) dollarization that ranges between 6% and 62% (2.5% and 52%). Typically, however, the countries for which the EU factor explains a high proportion of movements in one type of dollarization, also does for the other. Such cases are represented by the Czech Republic, Poland, the Slovak Republic and Slovenia. 13 It is for these countries that the EU factor is more (or equally)
important than the country-speci…c factor in explaining variations in deposit dollarization.
How Much of the discrepancy between the relative roles of the world and EU factors mirrors changes in the relative importance of country-speci…c factors, as shown in columns (3) and (6) of Table 4 . Clearly, country-speci…c factors have played, on average, a more important role for the group of countries that has not been involved with EU accession procedures. The greater importance of country-speci…c factors in these countries, in explaining dynamics in FD, re ‡ect the diverse experiences among transition countries.
Conclusion
This paper addresses the role of institutions for the extent of …nancial dollarization in transition economies. Even though other studies also focused on the importance of institutions, we approach this issue by paying attention to a unique historical policy experiment that has taken place in Europe during the last …fteen years. This corresponds to the various stages of negotiations that each country has to undergo with the EU for full membership to be granted. This accession process requires candidate countries to improve their institutions and encourage government and monetary authorities alike to adopt sound policies and promote practices of good governance. Thus, the group of transition countries located in Central and Eastern Europe and the Former Soviet Union represent a natural environment to examine whether the road to EU admission has had any impact on uno¢ cial dollarization.
With this objective in mind, we apply a dynamic factor analysis that is particularly well suited to decompose ‡uctuations in …nancial dollarization into three components: a world factor, an EU factor, and a country-speci…c factor. We show that the world factor plays no role for the dynamics of deposit dollarization, but does explain a downward movement in loan dollarization. These results are mainly driven by the increased …nancial integration of all transition countries with the rest of the world. In addition, we …nd that the EU factor has an asymmetric impact on dollarization as it raises foreign currency loans and decreases respective deposits. These …ndings are associated with higher con…dence in the domestic currency, expectations of macroeconomic stability, lower currency risk and exchange rate convergence to the Euro.
Our results further suggest the signi…cance of the EU factor in explaining a substantial portion of the variation in uno¢ cial dollarization. For some countries, the role of the EU factor is even more important than the country-speci…c factor. We propose that this is linked to the degree of a country's business cycle synchronization with the euro area. Overall, our …ndings con…rm the signi…cance of institutional arrangements for …nancial dollarization. Notes: The pre-and post-accession periods correspond to the periods before and after the beginning of negotiations with the EU, as de…ned in Table 1 , column 2. -----Deposit Dollarization -------Loan Dollarization
Notes: The levels of the world factor are plotted above. These levels have been extracted using the methodology described in section 2. -----Deposit Dollarization -------Loan Dollarization
Note: The levels of the EU factor are plotted above. These levels have been extracted using the methodology described in section 2.
